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Though all-or-nothing oblivious transfer and one-out-of-two oblivious transfer are equivalent in
classical cryptography, we here show that due to the nature of quantum cryptography, a protocol
built upon secure quantum all-or-nothing oblivious transfer cannot satisfy the rigorous definition of
quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Mystery of quantum cryptography has long intrigued
scientists. On one hand, several cryptographic tasks such
as the quantum conjugate coding[1] and the well-known
quantum key distribution[2, 3, 4] have made great suc-
cesses. They achieved theoretically unbreakable security
which can never be reached by their classical counter-
parts. But, on the other hand, some no-go theorems
were established, indicating that quantum cryptography
is not always powerful for any task. In particular, the
MLC no-go theorem [5, 6] rules out the possibility of non-
relativistic unconditionally secure quantum bit commit-
ment (QBC), and the Lo’s insecurity proof of one-sided
two-party quantum secure computations[7] indicates that
one-out-of-two oblivious transfer is impossible either.
Oblivious transfer (OT) is an important concept found
to be very useful in designing multi-party cryptography
protocols[8]. There are two major flavours of OTs. The
original one[1, 9] is simply known as oblivious trans-
fer, while sometimes can also be called all-or-nothing
OT. Another related notion was proposed later, which
is called one-out-of-two OT[10]. In classical cryptogra-
phy, it was shown that these two are computationally
equivalent[11]. Essentially, a protocol was presented in
Ref.[11] to illustrate that secure all-or-nothing OT can
lead to secure one-out-of-two OT. Furthermore, it was
believed that secure one-out-of-two OT can lead to se-
cure BC[7]. This standard classical reduction chain re-
veals the connection between the security of OT and BC
protocols in the classical level.
Very recently, a quantum all-or-nothing OT protocol
was developed [12]. This OT does not rigorously sat-
isfy the requirement of one-sided two-party quantum se-
cure computation protocols, on which the Lo’s insecurity
proof was based. Thus it could remain unconditionally
secure against the cheating strategy in the Lo’s proof.
Nevertheless, at the first glance, this result would con-
flict with the Lo’s conclusion and in turn with the MLC
no-go theorem (i.e., secure quantum one-out-of-two OT
and QBC would be possible) if the mentioned standard
classical reduction were justified.
More intriguingly, it has also been realized that “re-
ductions and relations between classical cryptographic
tasks need not necessarily apply to their quantum
equivalents”[13]. Indeed, it will be shown in this pa-
per that once we intend to build an one-out-of-two OT
protocol on a secure quantum all-or-nothing OT proto-
col with the method developed in Ref.[11], it is impos-
sible that the resultant protocol can satisfy the rigorous
definition of one-out-of-two OT on which the Lo’s proof
was based. In this sense, secure quantum all-or-nothing
OT does not imply secure quantum one-out-of-two OT,
i.e. the above classical reduction chain is broken in the
present quantum cryptography case. As a result, there
exists no logic conflict between the existence of secure
quantum all-or-nothing OT protocol and the MLC no-go
theorem of QBC.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sec-
tions, the definitions of two flavors of OTs will be stated
precisely and a brief review on their classical equivalence
will be presented. The relationship between these OTs
in the quantum level will be revealed in the section IV,
and how it is related to the cheating strategy in the Lo’s
proof will be studied in the section V. In the section VI,
it will be indicated that the breaking of the reduction
chain is not simply a matter of the definition, rather it
is originated from the nature of quantum cryptography
itself.
II. DEFINITIONS
Let us first state precisely the definitions of different
OTs on which the discussion in this paper is based. In
Ref.[11] where the classical equivalence between these
OTs was proven, the definitions of all-or-nothing OT and
one-out-of-two OT were summarized as:
Definition A: all-or-nothing OT
(A-i) Alice knows one bit b.
(A-ii) Bob gets bit b from Alice with probability 1/2.
(A-iii) Bob knows whether he got b or not.
(A-iv) Alice does not know whether Bob got b or not.
2Definition B: one-out-of-two OT
(B-i) Alice knows two bits b0 and b1.
(B-ii) Bob gets bit bj and not bj¯ with Pr(j = 0) =
Pr(j = 1) = 1/2.
(B-iii) Bob knows which of b0 or b1 he got.
(B-iv) Alice does not know which bj Bob got.
In the Lo’s insecurity proof of one-sided two-party
quantum secure computations[7], a more rigorous defi-
nition of one-out-of-two OT was specifically introduced
as:
Definition C: rigorous one-out-of-two OT
(C-i) Alice inputs i, which is a pair of messages
(m0,m1).
(C-ii) Bob inputs j = 0 or 1.
(C-iii) At the end of the protocol, Bob learns about
the message mj , but not the other message mj¯ , i.e., the
protocol is an one-sided two-party secure computation
f(m0,m1, j = 0) = m0 and f(m0,m1, j = 1) = m1.
(C-iv) Alice does not know which mj Bob got.
Meanwhile, the definition of one-sided two-party quan-
tum secure computations used in the Lo’s proof reads
Definition D: one-sided two-party secure computation
Suppose Alice has a private (i.e. secret) input
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and Bob has a private input j ∈
{1, 2, ...,m}. Alice helps Bob to compute a prescribed
function f(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, ..., p} in such a way that, at the
end of the protocol:
(a) Bob learns f(i, j) unambiguously;
(b) Alice learns nothing [about j or f(i, j)];
(c) Bob knows nothing about i more than what logi-
cally follows from the values of j and f(i, j).
Obviously, Definition C is a special case of Definition
D. In Ref.[7] it is proven that any protocol satisfying
Definition D is insecure. Therefore as a corollary, there
should not exist a secure quantum one-out-of-two OT
protocol which satisfies Definition C rigorously.
III. CLASSICAL EQUIVALENCE
The proof of the classical equivalence between the two
flavors of OTs is provided in Ref.[10]. The major part of
the proof is the following procedure, showing how secure
one-out-of-two OT can be implemented upon secure all-
or-nothing OT.
Protocol P:
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a security parameter s;
(2) Alice chooses at random Ks bits r1, r2, ..., rKs;
(3) For each of these Ks bits Alice uses the all-or-
nothing OT protocol to disclose the bit rk to Bob;
(4) Bob selects U = {i1, i2, ..., iαs} and V =
{iαs+1, iαs+2, ..., i2αs} where αs = Ks/3 with U ∩ V = ∅
and such that he knows rkl for each kl ∈ U ;
(5) Bob sends (X,Y ) = (U, V ) or (X,Y ) = (V, U) to
Alice according to a random bit j;
(6) Alice computes c0 =
⊕
x∈X
rx and c1 =
⊕
y∈Y
ry;
(7) Alice returns to Bob b0 ⊕ c0 and b1 ⊕ c1;
(8) Bob computes
⊕
u∈U
ru ∈ {c0, c1} and uses it to get
his secret bit bj .
IV. RELATIONSHIP AT THE QUANTUM
LEVEL
Though the two definitions of one-out-of-two OT (Def-
initions B and C) seem to be consistent with each other,
we here will show that, in the quantum level, if a secure
quantum all-or-nothing OT protocol satisfies Definition
A and can be used as a “black box”, a Protocol P built
upon it via the above procedure does not satisfy Defini-
tion C rigorously, though it satisfies Definition B.
The deviation from Definition C lies in (C-i) and (C-
iii). Consider Alice’s input i in Protocol P. In the step
(7) of the protocol, we can see that i includes not only
the secret bits b0 and b1, but also c0 and c1. The steps
(5) and (6) shows that c0 and c1 not only depend on
Alice’s input r1, r2, ..., rKs, but also depend on how Bob
selectsX , Y , U and V , i.e. they depend on Bob’s input j.
Therefore, Protocol P cannot be viewed as a “black box”
function f(i(m0,m1), j), where i and j are the private
inputs of Alice and Bob respectively. Instead, it has the
form f(i(m0,m1, j), j), where Alice’ input will be varied
according to Bob’s input, and its value is not determined
until Bob’s input has been completed. That is, Protocol
P does not rigorously satisfy Definition C, nor Definition
D as the description of the function f is different.
Though the difference seems tiny at the first glance, its
consequences are significant at the quantum level. This
can be seen from two aspects:
(I) The con side: Protocol P cannot be used as a black
box since the sequence of the participants’ inputs is im-
portant, i.e. we have to deal with the details of the pro-
tocol when it is used to build other protocols. As argued
in the introduction of Ref.[7], to ensure that the standard
classical reduction can apply to quantum cryptographic
protocols, “one must be allowed to use a quantum crypto-
graphic protocol as a ‘black box’ primitive in building up
more sophisticated protocols and to analyze the security
of those new protocols with classical probability theory”.
Therefore the above character of Protocol P make it un-
suitable to be used as a rigorous quantum one-out-of-two
OT to connect the reduction chain between quantum all-
or-nothing OT and QBC. Other applications of Proto-
col P in quantum cryptography may also have a limited
power.
(II) The pro side: Protocol P is not covered by the
cheating strategy in Ref.[7] for the following reason.
According to the strategy, Bob can change the value
of j from j1 to j2 by applying a unitary transforma-
tion to his own quantum machine. Therefore he can
3learn f(i(m0,m1), j1) and f(i(m0,m1), j2) simultane-
ously without being found by Alice. However, for the
function f(i(m0,m1, j), j), the value f(i(m0,m1, j1), j2)
is meaningless. Without the help of Alice, Bob cannot
change i from i(m0,m1, j1) to i(m0,m1, j2). Hence he
cannot learn f(i(m0,m1, j1), j1) and f(i(m0,m1, j2), j2)
simultaneously by himself. Namely, though the cheating
strategy works for any protocol satisfying Definition D,
it does not work for Protocol P.
On the other hand, though c0 and c1 depend on Bob’s
input j, from the protocol it can be seen clearly that they
are insufficient for Alice to learn the value of j. Thus
Protocol P is still secure against Alice. In this sense, the
relaxed definition of one-out-of-two OT (Definition B) is
satisfied.
V. DEFEATING THE CHEATING STRATEGY
In this section, the above conclusion (II) will be rig-
orously proven. For convenience, let us first recall the
cheating strategy in the Lo’s proof in more details. Ac-
cording to the section III of Ref.[7], in any protocol sat-
isfying Definition D, Alice and Bob’s actions on their
quantum machines can be summarized as an overall uni-
tary transformation U applied to the initial state |u〉in ∈
HA ⊗HB, i.e.
|u〉fin = U |u〉in . (1)
When both parties are honest,
∣∣uh
〉
in
= |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B and
∣∣uh
〉
fin
= |vij〉 ≡ U(|i〉A ⊗ |j〉B). (2)
Therefore the density matrix that Bob has at the end of
protocol is
ρi,j = TrA |vij〉 〈vij | . (3)
Bob can cheat in this protocol, because given j1, j2 ∈
{1, 2, ...,m}, there exists a unitary transformation U j1,j2
such that
U j1,j2ρi,j1(U j1,j2)−1 = ρi,j2 (4)
for all i. It means that Bob can change the value of
j from j1 to j2 by applying a unitary transformation
independent of i to the state of his quantum machine.
This equation is proven as follows.
Alice may entangles the state of her quantum machine
A with her quantum dice D and prepares the initial state
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉D ⊗ |i〉A . (5)
She keeps D for herself and uses the second register A
to execute the protocol. Suppose Bob’s input is j1. The
initial state is
|u′〉in =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉D ⊗ |i〉A ⊗ |j1〉B . (6)
At the end of the protocol, it follows from Eqs.(1) and
(6) that the total wave function of the combined system
D, A, and B is
|vj1〉in =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉D ⊗ U(|i〉A ⊗ |j1〉B). (7)
Similarly, if Bob’s input is j2, the total wave function at
the end will be
|vj2〉in =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉D ⊗ U(|i〉A ⊗ |j2〉B). (8)
Due to the requirement (b) in Definition D, the reduced
density matrices in Alice’s hand for the two cases j = j1
and j = j2 must be the same, i.e.
ρAlicej1 = TrB |vj1〉 〈vj1 | = TrB |vj2 〉 〈vj2 | = ρAlicej2 . (9)
Equivalently, |vj1〉 and |vj2〉 have the same Schmidt de-
composition
|vj1〉 =
∑
k
ak |αk〉AD ⊗ |βk〉B (10)
and
|vj2〉 =
∑
k
ak |αk〉AD ⊗ |β′k〉B . (11)
Now consider the unitary transformation U j1,j2 that ro-
tates |βk〉B to |β′k〉B. Notice that it acts on HB alone
and yet, as can be seen from Eqs.(10) and (11), it rotates
|vj1〉 to |vj2〉, i.e.
|vj2〉 = U j1,j2 |vj1〉 . (12)
Since
D 〈i |vj〉 = 1√
n
|vij〉 (13)
[see Eqs.(2), (7), and (8)], by multiplying Eq.(12) by D 〈i|
on the left, one finds that
|vij2〉 = U j1,j2 |vij1〉 . (14)
Taking the trace of |vij2 〉 〈vij2 | over HA and using
Eq.(14), Eq.(4) can be obtained.
Note that all these equations are just those presented
in the Lo’s proof [7]. We now consider Protocol P, where
Alice’s input i is dependent of Bob’s input j. In the above
proof, all i in the equations should be replaced by i(j)
from the very beginning. Consequently, Eq.(13) becomes
D 〈i(j)| vj〉 = 1√
n
∣∣vi(j)j
〉
. (15)
In this case multiplying Eq.(12) by D 〈i2| (i2 ≡ i(j2) for
short) on the left cannot give Eq.(14) any more. Instead,
the result is
|vi2j2〉 = U j1,j2U i1,i2 |vi1j1〉 , (16)
4where U i1,i2 ≡D |i2〉 〈i1|D. Then Eq.(4) is replaced by
U j1,j2U i1,i2ρi1,j1(U j1,j2U i1,i2)−1 = ρi2,j2 . (17)
Note that U i1,i2 is the unitary operation on Alice’s
side. This implies that without Alice’s help, Bob cannot
change the density matrix he has from ρi1,j1 to ρi2,j2 .
That is why Bob’s cheating strategy fails in Protocol P.
VI. ORIGIN OF THE INEQUIVALENCE
It is valuable to find out the underlying reason why
Protocol P does not satisfy the rigorous Definition C.
An illusion is naturally aroused that the reason is due to
a relaxed Definition A of all-or-nothing OT used in the
work. However, it is not true. In fact, we never need
to deal with the details of the all-or-nothing OT in the
section IV; we simply use it as a black box. Even when
the most rigorous definition of all-or-nothing OT is used,
the discussion in that section is still valid. Thus it is
not a matter of definition that the classical equivalence
between the two flavours of OTs cannot rigorously apply
to the present quantum case.
The real origin of this result can be found in the equa-
tions in the previous section. By comparing Eqs.(13)
and (15), we can see that if there does not exist a system
D, Protocol P will become insecure too. That is, if Al-
ice does not introduce the quantum system D in Eq.(5),
Protocol P will show no difference from the protocols
satisfying Definition D. In classical cryptography, Alice
surely does not have such a system. That is why the two
flavors of OTs seem equivalent. In quantum cryptogra-
phy, if Alice does not make full use of the computational
power but simply executes the protocol with the quan-
tum system A alone, she cannot defeat Bob’s cheating
either. The difference between Protocol P and a rigor-
ous one-out-of-two OT can only be manifested when the
protocol is indeed executed at the quantum level. In this
sense, the underlying origin is the nature of quantum
cryptography itself.
VII. DISCUSSIONS AND SUMMARY
It has been shown that though one-out-of-two OT can
be built upon all-or-nothing OT in classical cryptogra-
phy, a Protocol P built upon a secure quantum all-or-
nothing OT protocol via the same method cannot sat-
isfy the rigorous Definition C of quantum one-out-of-two
OT. Considering that a secure quantum all-or-nothing
OT protocol was already established [12], which is not
denied by the Lo’s insecurity proof of the one-sided two-
party secure computations[7] because it does not satisfy
the requirement on which the proof is based, it seems un-
likely that such a protocol can lead to another protocol
satisfying the requirement. Furthermore, if a secure pro-
tocol satisfying the rigorous definition of quantum one-
out-of-two OT existed, it would be used as a black box
primitive to implement secure QBC according to Ref.[7],
conflicting with the MLC no-go theorem. On the con-
trary, it is more logically consistent that no other method
is available to build a rigorous quantum one-out-of-two
OT protocol upon quantum all-or-nothing OT. That is,
the two flavors of OTs should not be rigorously equivalent
in quantum cryptography.
Though the profound understanding of the exact rela-
tionship between the two flavors of OTs at the quantum
level is still awaited, at least, one thing is clearly elab-
orated in this work: the classical equivalence between
these OTs cannot be directly applied to quantum cryp-
tography. This finding provides yet an intriguing exam-
ple demonstrating that reductions and relations between
classical cryptographic tasks need careful re-examination
in quantum cases.
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